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NIEMEYER ON LAW WITHOUT FORCE*-A REvrnw

Josef L. Kunz t

W

HEREAS Lauterpacht 1 tried to determine the function of law
in the international community, Niemeyer investigates the function of politics in international law. His book is on politics, but it is
theoretical in its treatment and not political. The book not only represents an ambitious work, but is certainly interesting and stimulating.
As to his ideas, Niemeyer derives from Herman Heller,2 to whom the
book is dedicated. Heller's theory of the States is not a legal, but a
sociological, a functional theory of the modern, occidental State as it
developed since the Renaissance, a theory which stands halfway between Kelsen's "pure theory of law" and Carl Schmitt's "pure theory
of power." Heller's starting-point is the nonexistence of isolated individuals, independent of social relationships. The social-political world
is dialectically formed, a living thing and, therefore, a contradictory
reality of human behavior. The task of his theory is to analyze the
particular reality of the modern State, to understand it in its present
structure and function. His theory, opposed to aprioristic norms of
natural law, is not a theory for theory's sake. It is motivated by practical ends. His method is that of a cultural science of reality, his object
of investigation the State as Gestalt, as a real structure, active in the
social-historical world. All social reality is individual and collective
effect in indissoluble dialectic unity. Heller conceives the State neither
in an atomistic sense as a mechanism, composed of individuals, nor as
an organism, but as organization. The State does not consist of men,
but of human performances. The genus proximum of the State is
organization, the differentia specifica, as compared with all other organizations, is its independent and supreme organization and activization of territorial social cooperation, and its justification lies in the

* LAW WITHOUT FoRcE; The Function of Politics in International Law. By
Gerhart Niemeyer-Lecturer in Politics, Princeton University. Princeton, N. J.:
Princeton University Press. 1941. Pp. xiv, 408. $3.75.
Professor of International Law, University of Toledo College of Law. Dr. Jur.,
Dr. Rer. Pol., University of Vienna. Formerly Professor at the Hague Acadamy of
International Law.-Ed.
1 H. LAuTERPACHT, THE FuNcTioN oF LAw IN THE INTERNATIONAL CoMMUNITY (1933).
2 Although the influence of other thinkers is also clearly seen, particularly of E.
fEILCHENFELD, VoLKERRECHTSPOLITIK ALS WISSENSCHAFT (1922).
8 H. HELLER, STAATSLEHRE (1934).
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fact that it represents the organization necessary for securing the law
at a certain stage of evolution. While force is not an essential quality of
law, the modern State has a State monopoly of legal physical force.
That is why the summit of the organization represents the limit for
securing the law by organizational coercion.
Just as Heller,4 in trying to show that the "political" is not mere
blind struggle for power but has an objective meaning, was working
under the shadow of the totalitarian development, so Niemeyer in his
book reflects the present-day international crisis. According to him,
our present-day international law has completely broken down; this
cannot merely be the consequence of the "wickedness" of some governments; the fault must lie with international law itself: the unlawfulness
of international reality is only a consequence of the unreality of international law. Reconstruction means a new orientation in the direction
of a "functional international law," based on a realistic account of the
past.
As to the critique of Niemeyer's starting point: This writer agrees
that the "new" international law of the "period between two WorldWars" has broken down, but disagrees with the author's thesis of the
disappearance of all international law. Such a statement is simply not
true, as a look at international reality shows. This writer agrees with
the author's distinction between a mere violation of the law and a
revolt against the law; but it must be said that such revolt happens also
in municipal law, as every revolution or civil war proves, and that,
on the other hand, even in the present war many violations of the law
are mere violations, not a revolt against the law. This writer agrees
with the author as to the present distortion and abuse of international
law, but these are, by no means, new phenomena, nor are they restricted
to the field of international law: Voltaire said in the eighteenth century that the principle of the sanctity of treaties is mostly honored by
breaking them; Talleyrand stated, long before the recent Spanish
Civil War, that nonintervention means in international affairs about
the same thing as intervention; the Roman jurists had for such "concealed lawlessness" coined the phrase, agere in fraudem legis. Nor is
the present condition of international law a peculiarity of international
law: it is only one form of uncertainty which is to be found in all realms
4
Heller's work, not entirely finished, and edited, after the author's death, by
Niemeyer, deals with international law only accidentally. But his remarks in this
direction are very different from Niemeyer's theory. Cf. my book review on Heller,
Staatslehre, 29 AM. J. INT. L. 543 (1935).
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of human activity, a particular instance of the "escandalosa pro.visionalidad," 5 which is so characteristic of our epoch of crisis and transformation.
As to Niemeyer's first part, historical in character, this writer questions the correctness of the assertion that international law was "born"
in the seventeenth century. Our international law has been developing,
within the Catholic universality of the Middle Ages, since the twelfth
century. That the "new science of international law" drew from the
sources of the scholastic philosophy and of Roman law, that it presupposed _an eternal, natural law, although the lex aeterna of St.
Thomas was replaced by the lex naturalis, the dictamen rectae ratioms
of Grotius, is correct. But this writer cannot agree with Niemeyer's
thesis that international law during the period of liberalism was characterized by a shift of the center of gravity from politics to economics,
from the State to Society, that international law became "non-political,"
was made only to fit an individualistic, capitalistic, interdependent
world-society. It follows, according to the author, that today, with the
end of laissez-faire, with the rise of autarchy and authoritarianism, with
the predominance of State interests over individual interests, with the
disruption of the earlier "international society" of trading individuals
through the invasion of the economic sphere by the State, our presentday international law is absolutely obsolete in its concepts, standards
and rules. It is obsolete, he affirms, because, under the present international law, States are operated only as means, not as ends, are constituted only instruments, not ultimate values, whereas in reality it
is the interest of States which clash in these days marked by the
ascendancy of politics over private affairs.
This writer agrees with the analysis of the present period of crisis
and transformation as a movement away from superindividualism to
a more collectivistic, social form of thinking. But the analysis of the
pre-world war international law seems to be based on too one-sided an
economic interpretation. It is the same mistake as in the Marxian
theory of law: had Marx only pointed out the great importance of
economic factors, he would have been on sound ground; but his attempt
to explain the whole world, the whole law, exclusively as a "superstructure" over economic interests, is untenable, as is any attempt to
reduce this complicated world of ours to only one factor. True, many
rules presuppose the distinction between State activities and private
activities, e.g., in the law of neutrality. But to say generally that inter5
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national law only served the interests and exigencies of a world-society
of trading individuals, is certainly grossly exaggerated. Read the diplomatic documents to ·see what enormous role was played by the conception of prestige, i.e., reputation for power. Hegel's philosophy,6 which
has exercised so wide an influence, shows that the adoration of the State
was, by no means, unknown to the nineteenth century. The State,
according to Hegel, is the realization of the moral idea, the Fate imposing itself in its omnipotence irresistibly; everything is absorbed by
the State and it is only in the State that the individual is fully realized.
In the second part, Niemeyer reviews the legal theory since Gro. tius. He shows that the international law since the Renaissance depended on morality, whereas in the present epoch of the Mass Man
the individual's organizational orientation no longer responds to moral
appeals but to efficiency and rapidity of organized action. Legal theory,
he tells us, has since the seventeenth century been dominated by the
"personalistic," atomistic approach; the consequence has been a dualism
between subjective reality ("the interests of the States," the raison
d'Etat) and an objective ideality based on conscience ("natural law");
law has been conceived as a normative restriction "from without" of
the liberty of States. The personalistic approach, therefore, presupposes "natural law,"· universal standards of morality. Even the positivistic doctrine was forced to reintroduce natural law in a concealed
form. But the vagueness and formalism of such concepts as "Family
of Nations," "Pacta sunt servanda" and so on, opened the door wide
to arbitrary speculations of international lawyers. ·
But as there no longer exists a common standard of reference in
the ideal of interindividual morality, and as on the other hand, international law is necessary to prevent the cult of mere power at the
sacrifice of culture, a fundamental reconstruction imposes itself: abandonment of the ethical basis and replacement by a functional basis. The
new "functional international law'' must find transnational elements
within the very domain of political function.
The "functional approach," the author suggests, is the way out.
As the States are, by definition, the topmost agencies of power in human
society and as there is no possibility of a compulsion against them, except in the form of war, the "new international law" must be a "law
without force," binding by virtue of its own merit, effective because of
its inherent appeal. International law must not start with the conflicting "interests" of the States, but with their functional connectedness,
6 GRUNDLINIEN DER PHILOSOPHIE DES RECHTS (1821).
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with the State as "autonomous organization and actualization of social
cooperation in a certain territory," with the State which, because of its
inherent function, is, at the same time, also a "local agency of international social relationships."
Functional approach: by whom? By international law or by the
science of international law? The functions of law and of legal science
are, by no means, the same. Apparently, Niemeyer wants a functional
approach by the science for laying the ground work of a functional
international law.
Such "functional approach" has often been urged upon international
lawyers by sociological jurists.7 But in contradistinction to the "realists," 8 Niemeyer-thank God-recognizes that it is impossible to solve
a single legal problem without resorting to normative standards which
transcend the actual given facts. Therefore, he assigns to legal theory
the principal task of analyzing the patterns and forms in our social
system and the rational lines recognized by men as guides of their
co-ordinate behavior. But how shall an international lawyer qua international lawyer be competent for such task? It is an old illusion that
a lawyer, merely because he is a lawyer, is also an expert in politics,
economics, sociology and everything. One might as well make it a
principal task of sociology to make biological studies. 9
The third part, showing the way to reconstruction, proposes a
functional approach as a normative one, approaching social phenomena
"as they ought to be." The author looks for a basis of non-moral
values operating in the actual structure of social relationships, for a
principle of immanent evaluation of reality, for the "transpersonal
reason" of co-ordination inherent in individual acts. He is, after all,
not a sociological, but a normative jurist. But his method is not a
teleological one, and the criterion of legal order is for him not purpose,
7
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Pound, "Philosophical Theory and International Law,"
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71 at 89 (1923), sets to international lawyers "a great task of social engineering

••• a functional critique of international law in terms of social ends, not an analytical
critique in terms of itself."
8
Cf., e.g., "A realistic understanding [ of the law is] possible only in terms of
observable behavior," Llewellyn, "A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step," 30
CoL. L. REv. 431 at 464 (1930). As a critique of such an erroneous attitude, it is
enough to quote the phrase of CoHEN, LAw AND THE SFCIAL ORDER 205 (1933):
"if the behaviorists succeeded ••• they would have a descriptive sociology, not a juristic
science."
9
In fact, there are natural scientists who seem to suggest that a workable international law is possible only on a biological basis. E.g., HUXLEY, MAN STANDS ALONE
(1941), sees the fulfillment of the task of formulating a social basis for civilization in
our critical epoch only on the foundation of a new world picture reflecting the biologist's
special knowledge of the human being in all his uniqueness.
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but function. He distinguishes between the purposes as set by individual wills and the ends that constitute the meaning of social phenomena; the functional ends are relatively autonomous with regard to
individual purposes. Social reality is structured according to an order
of its own. A functional law emphasizes the inherent lawfulness of
social conduct, not mere passive obedience to prescriptions. Such functional values do exist, the author asserts, and they have a strong normative appeal for the modern mind.
In conformity with the postulate that law knows only man-in-connectedness, the functional reorientation must start from the personification of the State, an inheritance from the Roman law, which selected
the natural individuals, as isolated and complete biological units, for
the cornerstone of the legal system. This attack, which can be found
already in Oswald Spengler,1° is not quite justified. I need hardly
mention that in Kelsen's system the person--entirely different from
the "man"-is merely a juridical construction, a conceptual point of
reference for the imputation of legal duties and rights. But already in
Roman law it is not the biological unit "homo," but the juridical construction "persona" which matters; a slave is a man, but not a person.
The cognition that the single individual and his self-perfection is no
concern of the law, that the law is interested only in man-in-connectedness, is equally very old, as shown by Aristotle's emphasis on the
1rpoc. i:.Tepov relation in law or Dante's definition of law as "homims
ad hominem proportio."
The meaning of Niemeyer's replacing of the "substantival" conception of the State by a functional one, made by reference, not to
existence, but to performances, can best be expressed in Feilchenfeld's
words: "nicht Menschendienst, sondern Werk am sachlichen Ideal."
Institutions follow laws of inherent functional necessity; but that
does not prevent a conflict between lawfulness and lawlessness. While
taking a strong stand against the imperative theory of law, the author
admits that legal rules are not submitted to the judgment of every individual's conscience. In his functional approach he tries to replace the
imperative theory by a conception of law as the element of orderliness,
inherent in the actual behavior of individuals (he often refers to the
parallel of language). If the legal order exists in actual legal conduct,
then the problems of revision, of obligatory force, of coercion disappear. Law cannot be made. The validity of legal rules is sustained
by the actual behavior of individuals within the framework of social
10

Who asks how long the modern law will be a law of personae and res, based
on the vanished economy of antiquity, and when, finally, the engineer, thinking in
terms of functions, will get the law, adequate to his world.
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institutions. But law is not a formula for factual regularity of behavior, it is a standard of "required" behavior. And the criterion of
"requiredness" is the transpersonal end with a view to which individual acts are coordinated in a relationship. The test of validity of
legal rules is the legal conviction of people. The law must be found
in social reality, it cannot be deliberately made. While mere "regulations," based on practical expediency, not on "inner necessity" may
have their value, statutes will, in a functional law, be of decidedly
secondary importance.
Functional international law is not equivalent to the endorsement
of every political reality; it can only be realized as the intrinsic lawfulness of the behavior of individuals acting on behalf of States. As to
international law, all its present possibilities are exhausted. The cry
for "international organization" and the "federal fallacy" lead inescapably to the World State, and the World State is neither possible,
nor desirable. What is possible, are international agencies with tasks,
specified and concretely agreed upon in advance; possible also are
"regulations" as auxiliary means. But the real international law must
be a functional one; the legal rules, which cannot be made wilfully,
represent the immanently necessary line of conduct pertaining to social
relationships. What is needed is not to act, but to wait, not organization, but reorientation.
Niemeyer admits, as he has to admit, that the two spheres of Isness
and of Oughtness constitute two di:fferent worlds, which cannot be
deduced from each other, a Kantian cognition which is at the bottom of
Kelsen's pure theory of law; neither does he reduce the law to facts,
as many sociological jurists do; he tries rather to solve the conflict
between the ideal and the real, between "actual" and "required" conduct, by putting both spheres, Sein and Sollen, into the social reality
and determining the "required" conduct, the legal rules, by immanent
values, by the inherent finality of social institutions, a sort of transplantation of Aristotle's Evn:A~xla from the organism to the social
organization.
But is this not a new form of natural law? The author defends himself against the implication of an ordre nature!, on the ground that
his concept of law refers, not to a natural, but to a cultural orderliness.
But the historical school of jurisprudence, too, emphasized its stand
against natural law and yet in the end simply replaced a philosophical
with a historical natural law. Do we not have here sociological natural
law? There are, indeed, many parallels between Niemeyer's theory and
the historical school, which comes from Hegel and his conception of his-
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toric evolution and of the State: the emphasis on the secondary character of legislation; the idea that law is found, not made; the everrecurrent analogy of the language; the teaching that law is not a
product of human will, but a common conviction; the insistence, not
upon the organized force of the political society, but upon social pressure behind the rules.
Law without force? Only international law, or also constitutional
law? 11 But does not Niemeyer tell us that his functional concepts hold
good for all law?
There are laws of inherent functional necessity, which individuals,
regardless of their personal purpose, must follow to achieve a transpersonal end, we are told. Certainly, the members of a symphony
orchestra must follow a required behavior, if the transpersonal end, a
perfect performance of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony, is to be achieved.
But are these rules of law? Is the functional "law without force" not a
replacement of law by "social-technical" rules in the sense of Paschukanis?
Intrinsic lawfulness of required behavior by individuals acting on
behalf of States; what States? States are topmost agencies of power
within a certain territory. What territory? Inherent finality for transpersonal ends. What ends? To this fundamental question, Niemeyer,
again referring to the analogy of language, admits no concise answer
can be given; ultimately, he says, it is the human being who, through
his stewardship of social relationships, contributes his share to the
constant development of the criterion of lawfulness. Are we here not
again left with the "silently-operating forces" of the historical school?
How can a behavior be regarded as legally required for transpersonal
ends, if we have no measure for those ends? What Lorimer said against
the utilitarians, we may ask here, too, replacing "purpose" by "function": "Function for what? Before we can measure by results, the
results must be measured."
But such questions are not intended to detract froni the value of
the book. It is a thesis and does not pretend to constitute an ultimate
solution. It is a highly interesting, challenging work; ~t is born out
of a deep desire, which we all share, to see this war followed by a
lasting and e:ffective order in international relations. This is not the
place for the writer to develop his ideas as to the future of international law; but it is an agreeable duty for the critic to congratulate the
author.
11 Some German writers isolate international and constitutional law from the
other fields of law as "Spitzenrecht."

